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ABSTRACT [152 words] 
 
This article investigates the Crown within the British constitution and gauges its influence upon the 
decision to deploy troops in Iraq.  It considers the functioning of parliamentary checks upon the Prime 
Ministerial war prerogative in the Iraq decision, specifically the parliamentary debate and vote on 
0DUFK  ,W LGHQWLILHVKRZ WKHSUHPLHUVKLS¶VFRORQLVDWLRQRI WKH&URZQHQDEOHG0U%ODLU WR
obtain parliamentary approval for warfare despite extensive opposition to the deployment.  The 
appearance of strengthening parliamentary involvement in warfare decisions was largely undercut by, 
amongst other factors, a cluster of prime ministerial Crown-based prerogatives.  Ultimately, the Iraq 
affair demonstrates that the Crown is not a quaint constitutional abstraction but has real influence on 
issues of the utmost importance.  The notion of monarch remains a subtle but powerful influence in the 
British prime ministerial war power legally, structurally and culturally, and parliamentary checks in 
this context may be thus institutionally limited.   
 
 
 
 
LONGER ABSTRACT [319 words] 
 
This article investigates the monarchic concept of Crown within the British constitution and gauges its 
influence upon the decision to deploy troops in Iraq in March 2003.  It considers the functioning of 
parliamentary checks upon the Prime Ministerial war prerogative in the Iraq decision, and specifically 
investigates the extent to which Crown-based powers may have enabled such checks to be 
counteracted. 
 
The article starts by discussing the close interrelationship between the office of Prime Minister and the 
monarch-based legal structure of the Crown which it has gradually colonised over centuries.  
Recognition of this symbiosis between Crown and premiership is vital to an understanding of modern 
British prime ministerial power, and how such power was utilised in the Iraq affair.  Next it considers 
WKHSULPHPLQLVWHULDOZDUSUHURJDWLYHDQGWKHNH\FRQVWLWXWLRQDOµFRQYHQWLRQ¶ZKLFKSOD\HGDFHQWUDO
role in the Iraq deployment, namely that Parliament should support warfare.  The parliamentary 
debate and substantive vote on March 18, 2003 (and subsequent reform proposals) have been widely 
viewed as a welcome strengthening of Parliament as a crucial check in such decisions.  Yet this view of 
the Iraq affair as a pyrrhic victory is queVWLRQDEOH  7KLV DUWLFOH LGHQWLILHV KRZ WKH SUHPLHUVKLS¶V
colonisation of the Crown enabled Mr Blair to exercise the war prerogative despite extensive 
opposition to the Iraq deployment.  It argues that the appearance of strengthening parliamentary 
involvement in warfare decisions was largely undercut by, amongst other factors, a cluster of prime 
ministerial Crown-based prerogatives.  These prerogatives enabled Mr Blair to manoeuvre the 
parliamentary vote, and therefore undermined its efficacy as a meaningful check.   
 
Ultimately, the Iraq affair demonstrates that the Crown is not just a quaint constitutional abstraction 
but has real influence on issues of the utmost importance.  The notion of monarch remains a subtle but 
powerful influence in the British prime ministerial war power legally, structurally and culturally, and 
parliamentary checks in this context may be thus institutionally limited.   
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µ)RXQWDLQRI+RQRXU¶"7KH5ROHRI&URZQLQWKH,UDT:DU 
 
 
The decision to deploy British troops in Iraq in March 2003 was the most contentious 
RI 7RQ\ %ODLU¶V SUHPLHUVKLS  ,t generated a wealth of opposition including the largest 
political demonstration in British history1 and various legal challenges,2 as well as eliciting no 
less than three separate inquiries chaired by Lords Hutton,3 Butler4 and, most recently, Sir 
John Chilcot.5  As more information concerning the Iraq affair has gradually come to light, it 
is apparent that it yields some illuminating insights as a case study in constitutional 
subversion.  To date, much of the domestic constitutional interest in the Iraq affair has 
primarily KLQJHG XSRQ 0U %ODLU¶V PDUJLQDOLVDWLRQ RI FROOHFWLYH FDELQet responsibility, 
particularly shared decision-making, in the lead up to the Iraq deployment,6 though attention 
has also been paid to the war power itself7 and the office of Attorney-General.8   
 
Though such matters clearly played key roles in the Iraq deployment, this article 
sheds light upon an additional, alternative dimension to the affair.  It considers the Iraq 
deployment throuJK WKH SULVP RI µWKH &URZQ¶ WKDW monarchic concept at the apex of the 
British constitution GHVFULEHG E\ %DJHKRW DV µWKH IRXQWDLQ RI KRQRXU¶9 in more deferential 
times.  Though the Crown is generally viewed as merely an arcane constitutional abstraction, 
in reality it played a key role in facilitating the initiation of military action in Iraq.  This 
article starts by briefly establishing the long-standing close interaction between Monarch and 
premier, a relationship which remains the foundation of modern prime ministerial power.  
Next it considers the Crown-based prime ministerial war prerogative and discusses the recent 
strengthening of the key constitutional check that Parliament should support any such military 
action.  Finally, it specifically examines the Iraq debate and vote in Parliament on March 18th, 
                                                 
1
 Between 750,000-1,000,000 people joined an anti-war protest in London on 15th February, the largest 
demonstration in British history: µ0LOOLRQ¶PDUFKDJDLQVW,UDTZDU¶, BBC Online (London: February 
16, 2003) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2765041.stm> accessed June 15, 2013. 
2
 For example see: R (on the application of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) v Prime Minister 
and others [2002] EWHC 2777 (Admin), [2002] All ER (D) 245 (Dec);  R (on the application of 
Gentle and another) v Prime Minister and others [2006] EWCA Civ 1689, [2007] Q.B. 689 (CA); R 
(on the application of Gentle and another) v Prime Minister and others [2008] UKHL 20, [2008] 1 
A.C. 1356. 
3
 Lord Hutton, Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death of Dr. David Kelly 
C.M.G., (January 2004, HC 247), accessible via <http://www.the-hutton-
inquiry.org.uk/content/report/index.htm> accessed June 15, 2013. 
4
 Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors (chair: Lord Butler), Review of Intelligence on Weapons 
of Mass Destruction, (July 2004, HC 898). 
5
 The Iraq Inquiry, led by Sir John Chilcot is expected to report its findings at an unspecified date in 
due course; <http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/> accessed June 15, 2013. 
6
 For example see: P. Hennessy, Informality and Circumscription: The Blair Style of Government in 
War and Peace, Political Quarterly, 2005, Vol. 76(1), 3; Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors 
(chair: Lord Butler), Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, (July 2004, HC 898) 
paras 609-611; House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Ninth Report, The Decision to go to 
War in Iraq (2002-03 HC 813-I) para.146. 
7
 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Fifteenth Report, :DJLQJ:DU3DUOLDPHQW¶V
Role and Responsibility (2005-06 HL 236-I); House of Commons Public Administration Select 
Committee, Fourth Report, Taming the Prerogative: Strengthening Ministerial Accountability to 
Parliament (2003-04 HC 422); D Jenkins, Constitutional Reform Goes to War: Some Lessons from 
the United States [2007] P.L. 258. 
8
 House of Constitutional Affairs Committee, Fifth Report, Constitutional Role of the Attorney General 
(2006-7 HC 306); House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Seventh Report, Reform of 
the Office of Attorney General (2007-8 HL 93).  
9
 W. Bagehot, The English Constitution (London: Collins, 1963) p.66.  
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2003 and identifies how Crown-based prerogatives may have undermined this as a 
meaningful check on warfare.   
 
 
[1] The Enduring Symbiosis of Monarchy and Premiership 
 
 
The office of British Prime Minister entitles its holder to what has been called a 
µIRUPLGDEOHEDWWHU\¶10 of personal powers, nearly all of which are exercised by virtue of the 
ancient prerogative which emanates from the Crown.  The office has emerged by fortune 
rather than GHVLJQ D µSURGXFW RI LQGLJHQRXV G\QDPLFV¶11 whose origins can be traced back 
over centuries.  Perhaps for this reason, there had never been an official definition of the 
prime ministerial role until publication of the Cabinet Manual in 2011.12  A comprehensive 
historical account of the premiership is beyond the scope of this article but a very brief 
overview of key events provides a valuable indication of the overall trajectory that led to the 
present-day premier-Monarch relationship. 
 
The Glorious Revolution in 1688 and Bill of Rights represents an early indirect 
contribution towards the prime ministerial position because it essentially emasculated 
monarchical power by placing Parliament above the King and in charge of the national purse 
strings.13  Two subsequent key contributors to the development of the premiership were 
Walpole and Pitt, both of whom enjoyed relative political predominance, albeit based upon 
their respective leadership styles rather than formal institutional power.  In 1721 Sir Robert 
Walpole came to hold the position of First Minister within Cabinet and is commonly 
DFNQRZOHGJHGDVWKHµILUVWSURWRW\SHRIWKHPRGHUQ3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶14 WKRXJKWKHWLWOHµ3ULPH
0LQLVWHU¶ ZDV QRW DWWDFKHG WR WKH RIILFH DW WKLV VWDJH  :DOSROH¶V SRZHU DURVH IURP his 
revolutionary approach which emphasised a firmer trinity of Cabinet unity, strong leadership 
and parliamentary support.15  William Pitt (the Younger) held office between 1783 and 1801 
and was responsible for the continuing increase in Cabinet unity16 and an upsurge in the 
dominance of the Prime Minister in relation to his Cabinet colleagues.17  Additionally, 
communications between the King and ministers were channelled through Pitt, a role that his 
modern counterparts continue to this day.18  These factors OHGXOWLPDWHO\WRD³substitution of 
the authority of the Prime Minister for that of the King´WKHODWWHURIZKRPDFFRUGLQJWR.HLU
                                                 
10
 T. Benn, Arguments for Democracy (London: Penguin 1982) p.26. 
11
  M. Foley, The British Presidency (Manchester: Manchester University Press 2000) p.26.   
12
 The Cabinet Office, The Cabinet Manual (1st edition, October 2011). 
13
 E. Wicks, The Evolution of a Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2006) Ch.1. 
14
 P. Hennessy, The Prime Minister, The Office and its Holders Since 1945 (London: Penguin 2001) 
p.22  :DOSROH¶V SUHmiership is viewed by Wicks as one of eight key moments in British 
constitutional history: Elizabeth Wicks, The Evolution of a Constitution (Hart Publishing 2006) Ch. 
3.  
15
 ³The Whig administration of Sir Robert Walpole sets the precedent for party ministries and 
thenceforward, though there are occasional aberrations, the bonds of party are drawn tighter.´)
W. Maitland, The Constitutional History of England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1931) 
p.395. 
16
 &DELQHWEHFDPHDWLJKWHUPDFKLQHGLVFXVVLRQVQRZ³confined to persons actually holding office and 
in agreement with the views of their colleagues´  D. L. Keir, The Constitutional History of Modern 
Britain since 1485, 9th edn (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1975) p.382. 
17
 &DUWHU ZULWHV WKDW GXULQJ WKLV WLPH ³LW ZDV WKH 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU¶V DXWKRULW\ YLV-à-vis his ministerial 
colleagues which expanded most noticeably, not his independence of the King.´  B. Carter, The 
Office of Prime Minister (London: Faber & Faber 1956) p.29. 
18
 7KH3ULPH0LQLVWHU³acts as medium of communication between Cabinet and Crown´ +DOVEXU\¶V
Laws of England (LexisNexis online), vol.8(2) (2011 reissue), para.412.  See also The Cabinet 
Office, The Cabinet Manual (1st edition, October 2011), paras 3.4-3.5. 
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ZDV ³was slowly, but quite unmistakably, losing effective leadership of his own 
government´19   
 
The nineteenth century saw further consolidation of prime ministerial office. The 
Reform Acts of 183220 and 1867 extended voting rights and indirectly contributed to the prime 
PLQLVWHULDOUROH7KHDFWVZKLWWOHGGRZQWKH.LQJ¶VSUHURJDWLYHSRZHURISDWURQDJHGLOXWLQJ
his influence in both Parliament21 and Cabinet.22  As a result, Cabinet was now increasingly 
reliant upon a majority following in Parliament which required strong leadership and party 
loyalty.  To obtain and preserve electoral support the Liberal and Conservative parties 
inevitably became stronger, centralised organisations.  The ties of party loyalty became 
tighter, impacting heavily upon the independence of M.P.s.23  Because government was more 
able to rely on a solid base of support it came to exert de facto control over Parliament rather 
than vice versa.24  Events of the twentieth century, particularly two World Wars, bolstered the 
prime ministerial role yet further.  Additionally, this was the first century in which the office 
was recognised formally25 and statutorily.26  Significantly, the proliferation of the mass media, 
particularly in the latter half of the twentieth century, inevitably shaped the office of Prime 
Minister by further increasing the focus upon party leaders and fostering a political culture of 
individualLVHG OHDGHUVKLS ZKLFK )ROH\ KDV WHUPHG µOHDGHUVKLS VWUHWFK¶27  Such tendencies 
became particularly prominent in the incumbencies of Margaret Thatcher28 and Tony Blair.29   
 
Ultimately the office of Prime Minister is a result of the cumulative effect of myriad 
influencing factors and forces interacting over centuries.  Many of the modifications have 
emerged organically and imperceptibly.  But the overall trajectory follows the waning of 
monarchical authority and inversely proportionate bolstering of the prime ministerial role, 
reflecting the fact that ³WKHSRZHUVRIWKHSULPHPLQLVWHU«KDYHEHHQZUHVWOHGDZD\IURPWKH
Throne´30  The office of Prime Minister covertly evolved on the underside of monarchy, 
                                                 
19
 D. L. Keir, The Constitutional History of Modern Britain since 1485, 9th edn, (London: Adam & 
Charles Black 1975) p.383.  
20
 For an interesting account of the passage of the 1832 Act see E. Wicks, The Evolution of a 
Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2006) Ch. 4. 
21
 I. Jennings, Cabinet Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1965 3rd edn) p.406. 
22
 D. L. Keir, The Constitutional History of Modern Britain since 1485, 9th edn (London: Adam & 
Charles Black 1975 9th edn) p.405. 
23
 ³Party discipline within Parliament became more rigid as the battles grew keener and the issues 
tended to resolve themselves into holding or gaining power ´  J. Mackintosh, The British Cabinet 
(London: Stevens & Sons 1977 3rd edn) p.203. 
24
 ³Ever tougher whipping and tautened parliamentary procedure were reducing the behavioural scope 
of the individual member, and the power to initiate legislation was moving steadily away from 
Parliament and into the executive.´  P. Hennessy, The Prime Minister, The Office and its Holders 
Since 1945 (London: Penguin 2001) p.41. 
25
 +DOVEXU\¶Vstates that the first reference to the prime ministerial office was on 2nd December 1905 
when a Royal Warrant was placed in the /RQGRQ*D]HWWH³The warrant is noticeable as containing 
an official recognition of the office of Prime Minister´7KHRQO\HDUOLHUUHIHUHQFHVHHPVWREHZKHQ
Lord Beaconsfield signed the Treaty of Berlin describing himself as Prime Minister.  +DOVEXU\¶V 
Laws of England (LexisNexis online), vol.8(2) (2011 reissue) para.395, fn.1. 
26
 The Chequers Estate Act 1917. 
27
 M. Foley, The British Presidency (Manchester: Manchester University Press 2000) Ch. 7, pp.340-
341.  See also: M. Foley in House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Role 
and Powers of the Prime Minister, Written Evidence (July 7, 2011) pp.67-74. 
28
 M. Foley, The British Presidency (Manchester: Manchester University Press 2000) Ch.3; P. 
Hennessy, The Prime Minister, The Office and its Holders Since 1945 (London: Penguin 2001) 
pp.425-6. 
29
 M. Foley, The British Presidency (Manchester: Manchester University Press 2000) Ch. 9; P. 
Hennessy, The Prime Minister, The Office and its Holders Since 1945 (London: Penguin 2001) 
pp.488-9. 
30
 T. Benn, Arguments for Democracy (London: Penguin 1982) p.20. 
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FRORQLVLQJ WKH ODWWHU¶V &URZQ SRZHUV DQG IXVLQJ LWVHOI WR that institution in the process.  
Because of this, the relationship between premier and the Crown remains fundamental to 
constitutional understandings of modern prime ministerial power. 
 
Prime Minister and the Crown 
 
The Crown occupies the apex of the British constitution, forming the legal source of 
executive SUHURJDWLYHSRZHU DQG3DUOLDPHQW¶V VRYHUHLJQW\31  Despite its pivotal role it is a 
multi-faceted concept with no single clear interpretation,32 and it has been taken to mean 
Monarch,33 government34  or state.35  Yet each of these meanings reflects traces of early 
British constitutional history when an individual Monarch was absolute and the source of all 
authority.  Indeed it still takes material form by vesting its powers in an individual Monarch at 
law.36  Thus, the legal framework around which modern British government power is 
structured is an autocratic, pyramidal formation with one individual, the Monarch, at its 
centre.  Nevertheless appearances of significant monarchical power at law are misleading as 
modern Monarchs do not enjoy the unbridled political command of their predecessors.  
Instead, the Monarch, in her politically constrained position as personification of the Crown, 
is effectively a conduit between Crown powers and the individual politicians who in reality 
now use them.   
 
The disparity between the Crown at law and constitutional practice occurring within 
it is widely acknowledged in mainstream constitutional thought.  The Crown has been termed 
DµOHJDOILFWLRQ¶37 µDFRQYHQLHQWDEVWUDFWLRQ¶38 and µa convenient cover for ignorance¶.39  The 
presence of this disparity is also acknowledged in caselaw such as Town Investments and 
Bancoult (No.2).40  For example in the former, Lord Diplock accused the legal vocabulary of 
µWKH&URZQ¶RIIDLOLQJ WRNHep pace with constitutional evolution and suggested that a clear 
line should be drawn between the Crown and government in reality.41  As the preceding 
historical summary shows, de facto ownership of Crown prerogative power has trickled down 
to elected government ministers, whilst de jure ownership has remained with Monarch.  But 
WKRXJK WKH &URZQ¶V H[HFXWLYH SRZHUV KDYH EHHQ FRORnised by government ministers their 
legal structure and form have remained intact and unaltered.  Thus one is left with what 
Loughlin, in a more general sense, has described DV³a gulf between substance and form in 
                                                 
31
 +DOVEXU\¶V VWDWHV³the Crown may not exercise primary legislative powers except with the consent of 
Parliament.´+DOVEXU\¶V/DZVRI(QJODQG (LexisNexis online), vol.8(2) (2011 reissue) para.15.  See 
also: R. Brazier, A British Republic, C.L.J. 61(2), July 2002, 351-385, 366. 
32
 +DOVEXU\¶V /DZV RI (QJODQG provides no less than three potential meanings: (1) monarch, (2) 
JRYHUQPHQW RU  RIILFHUV RU PLQLVWHUV DFWLQJ LQ WKHLU µRIILFLDO FDSDFLW\¶  +DOVEXU\¶V /DZV RI
England (LexisNexis online), vol.8(2) (2011 reissue) para.353.  See also: Town Investments Ltd v 
Department of the Environment [1978] A.C. 359 (HL), 393 (Lord Morris). 
33
 W:DGH ³Crown, Ministers and Officials: Legal Status and LiabiliW\´ in M. Sunkin & S. Payne 
(eds), The Nature of the Crown, A Legal and Political Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
1999) p.24.   
34
 +DOVEXU\¶V/DZVRI(QJODQG (LexisNexis online), vol.8(2) (2011 reissue) para.354.  See also: Town 
Investments Ltd v Department of the Environment [1978] A.C. 359 HL, 398 (Lord Simon). 
35
 This is not formally acknowledged as a free-VWDQGLQJ PHDQLQJ RI WKH WHUP WKRXJK µWKH &URZQ¶
represents the UK state at international level and foreign affairs are conducted in its name: 
+DOVEXU\¶V/DZVRIEngland (LexisNexis online), vol.8(2) (2011 reissue) para.801.   
36
 Town Investments Ltd v Department of the Environment [1978] A.C. 359 (HL), p.397. 
37
 Town Investments Ltd v Department of the Environment [1978] A.C. 359 (HL), 381 (Lord Diplock). 
38
 C. Munro, Studies in Constitutional Law 2nd edn (London: Butterworths 1999) p.255. 
39
 F. W. Maitland, The Constitutional History of England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1931) p.418. 
40
 R (on the application of Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
[2007] EWCA Civ 498, [2008] QB 365 (CA) at [114] (Clarke M.R.); [32] (Sedley L.J.). 
41Town Investments Ltd v Department of the Environment [1978] A.C. 359 (HL), pp.380-1.  See also: 
British Broadcasting Corporation v Johns [1965] Ch 32, 79 (Lord Diplock). 
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our institutions of government´42  This is because the formal, archaic terms used to label 
arrangements at the constitutional apex have remained intact, despite being superseded by 
political developments that have transformed the political workings of government in 
practical terms; the law views the Monarch as embodiment of the Crown as directing 
ministers whereas in political reality ministers (supported by a parliamentary majority) are in 
the dominant position.    
 
The ministerial advice convention arguably acts to mitigate this cleavage between 
modern political practice and the static Crown-based legal framework rooted in earlier 
centuries.  The requirement that the Monarch exercise prerogative powers upon ministerial 
DGYLFH LV D µSDUDPRXQW¶ FRQYHQWLRQ43 which plays an integral constitutional role despite its 
apparent non-legal status.  It limits the hereditary MRQDUFK¶V SROLWLFDO UROH DQG WUDQVIHUV
substantive decisions to democratically elected ministers, particularly the Prime Minister 
ZKRVH IRUHPRVW IXQFWLRQ LV OLVWHG E\ +HQQHVV\ DV µPDQDJLQJ WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ WKH
*RYHUQPHQW DQG WKH 0RQDUFK¶44  The ministerial advice convention enables the Prime 
Minister to access many of the MRQDUFK¶VSRZHUVLQWKHOHJDOHGifice including, vitally, those 
which were particularly relevant in the Iraq affair, namely: to declare war, to appoint and 
dismiss ministers, to request a dissolution of Parliament and to defend the realm.  The Prime 
Minister is impotent in law but enjoys de facto access to these monarchic prerogatives by 
virtue of this convention.  Thus exercising prerogatives necessitates a reciprocal relationship 
between the legally strong Monarch and politically powerful premier; a relationship which 
OHDGV +HQQHVV\ WR GHVFULEH %ULWDLQ DV D µGRXEOH KHDGHG QDWLRQ¶45  The Monarch appears 
legally omnipotent but politically impotent, whilst the Prime Minister is legally powerless but 
enjoys a position of political leadership, though its strength may fluctuate according to 
political fortunes and party loyalty.  Thus the premier and Monarch need one another; the 
prerogative powers must be exercised by a process of symbiosis.  The relationship is 
inescapably reciprocal; the Prime Minister requires the Monarch as a legitimate outlet to 
exercise Crown powers and the Monarch is incapacitated without prime ministerial advice 
and direction.  In this sense the premiership remains inherently fused to the Monarch and 
controls many aspects of the MRQDUFK¶VUROHLQWKHOHJDOHGLILFH     
 
8OWLPDWHO\LWLVDSSDUHQWWKDWDWODZWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶VSRVLWLRQKDVFRQWLQXHGPDQ\
characteristics of the monarchic predecessor it sought to replace and better.46  Because the 
office of Prime Minister gradually gleaned its powers away from the Monarch it never 
established its own independent legal foundations and is resultantly parasitic on monarchy.  
The Crown thus plays an integral role in the office of Prime Minister and its powers; legally, 
structurally and FXOWXUDOO\ D SUHPLHU¶V SRZers are inextricably linked to Monarch as 
embodiment of the Crown.  Furthermore, this relationship goes beyond mere historic or 
theoretical interest. Part three of this article demonstrates that in the lead up to the Iraq war 
the existing arrangements enabled Mr Blair to exploit a beneficial collection of once-
monarchic powers which remained obscure and fundamentally unchanged from their 
medieval nature and form.   
 
 
                                                 
42
 M. Loughlin ³7KH6WDWH WKH&URZQDQG/DZ´ in M. Sunkin & S. Payne (eds), The Nature of the 
Crown, A Legal and Political Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999) p.47. 
43
 +DOVEXU\¶V/DZVRIEngland (LexisNexis online), vol.8(2) (2011 reissue) para.21. 
44
 P. Hennessy in House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Role and 
Powers of the Prime Minister, Written Evidence (July 7, 2011) 10-14.   
45
 P. Hennessy, The Prime Minister, The Office and its Holders Since 1945 (London: Penguin 2001) 
Ch.3. 
46
 ³The prime minister is able to use the government to bring forward the policies which he or she 
IDYRXUVDQGWRVWRSWKRVHWRZKLFKKHRUVKHLVRSSRVHG«7RWKLVH[WHQWWKHFRQGXFWRIJRYHUQPHQW
business can be said to reflect a personal and autocratic rather than a collective and democratic 
spirit´7. Benn, Arguments for Democracy (London: Penguin 1982) p.29. 
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[2] The War Prerogative & Parliament 
 
 
             In Britain prerogative powers remain integral to the modern office of Prime Minister, 
enabling an incumbent premier to undertake a range of functions including appointing 
ministers, chairing Cabinet and other activities necessary to the conduct of government.47  
The prerogative power to declare war is one key prime ministerial power which has 
traditionally fallen within the wider prerogative to conduct foreign affairs. 
 
Foreign affairs is a vital area of prime ministerial involvement; since 1945 foreign 
policy and defencHKDYHIRUPHGDQHVVHQWLDOSDUWRIWKH%ULWLVKSUHPLHU¶VUROH48  This relative 
predominance in the foreign affairs field was illustrated throughout the Blair premiership 
which displayed a strong international dimension, particularly following the September 11 
attacks.49  The foreign affairs prerogative enables the Prime Minister and his Foreign 
Secretary to undertake a variety of activities necessary to conduct business with other 
sovereign states on behalf of the country, including entering international treaties and 
conducting diplomacy.50  The power to declare war and peace has long been categorised 
within this broader prerogative.51  However, because warfare entails the active engagement of 
the armed forces, often for defensive purposes, the war prerogative also inevitably involves a 
degree of overlap with the prerogative to defend the realm, though this latter prerogative is 
specifically concerned with matters such as military appointments, organisation and the day-
to-day conduct of military operations.52  Interestingly, a 2009 government review of 
prerogatives categorised declaring war alongside other defence-related powers,53 rather than 
within foreign affairs.  So though instigating war is a specific, self-contained prerogative,54 it 
occupies the blurred intersection between foreign affairs and defence. 
 
Though the specific prerogative power to declare war lies in fact with the Prime 
Minister,55 it lies with the Monarch at law.  ³War is an intensely prime ministerial activity´56 
and this is arguably attributable to the symbiosis between premier and Monarch discussed 
above.  As a Crown prerogative the conduct of war was once the preserve of the King.  Lord 
Reid stated in Burmah: 
                                                 
47
 +DOVEXU\¶V /DZV RI (QJODQG (LexisNexis online), vol.8(2) (2011 reissue) para.398; The Cabinet 
Office, The Cabinet Manual (1st edition, October 2011), paras 3.4-3.6; P. Hennessy in House of 
Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Role and Powers of the Prime Minister, 
Written Evidence (July 7, 2011) 10-14. 
48
 P. Hennessy, The Prime Minister, The Office and its Holders Since 1945 (London: Penguin 2001) 
pp.91-98. 
49
 A. Seldon, Blair (London: Free Press 2005) pp.498-507; D.  Blunkett, The Blunkett Tapes, My Life in 
the Bear Pit (London: Bloomsbury 2006) pp.311, 316, 320. 
50
 For a list of specific foreign affairs-related powers see Ministry of Justice, The Governance of 
Britain, Review of the Executive Royal Prerogative Powers: Final Report, (October 2009), Annex, 
p.31.  
51
 For example in 2003 the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee investigated the 
decision to go to war in Iraq: Ninth Report, The Decision to go to War in Iraq (2002-03 HC 813-I).  
See also: +DOVEXU\¶V Laws of England (LexisNexis online), vol.8(2) (2011 reissue) para.801. 
52
 For a list of specific defence-related powers see Ministry of Justice, The Governance of Britain, 
Review of the Executive Royal Prerogative Powers: Final Report, (October 2009), Appendix, 32.  
See also: +DOVEXU\¶V/DZVRI England (LexisNexis online), vol.8(2) (2011 reissue) para.885. 
53
 Ministry of Justice, The Governance of Britain, Review of the Executive Royal Prerogative Powers: 
Final Report, (October 2009), Annex, 32. 
54
 Ministry of Justice, The Governance of Britain, Review of the Executive Royal Prerogative Powers: 
Final Report, (October 2009), para.45. 
55
 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Fifteenth Report, :DJLQJ:DU3DUOLDPHQW¶V
Role and Responsibility (2005-06 HL 236-I), para.12. 
56
 P. Hennessy, The Prime Minister, The Office and its Holders Since 1945 (London: Penguin 2001) 
p.103.  
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³The reason for leaving the waging of war to the King (or now the executive) 
is obvious. A schoolboy's knowledge of history is ample to disclose some of the 
disasters which have been due to parliamentary or other outside attempts at 
control.´57 
 
Though this passage was delivered in the context of military destruction of oil fields to 
prevent their use by the advancing enemy in World War II, it nevertheless illustrates an 
interesting mind-set.  It implicitly assumes the superiority of a somewhat autocratic, 
patriarchal leadership culture of the sort exemplified by monarchy, and arguably continued in 
modern government.  Additionally, it depicts the consequences of greater supervisory checks 
and wider collective involvement in warfare decisions in stark terms.  As Lord Reid indicates, 
PRGHUQ JRYHUQPHQW¶V FRQGXFW of war remains rooted in notions of monarchy and its 
associated culture.  This association has been criticised by Gladstone who has stated of the 
ZDUSRZHU³Like all prerogative powers, this one harks back to the medieval notion of the 
Crown as absolute sovereign´58  Similarly Lord Lester has criticised such medieval 
prerogatives as anomalous.59 
 
Any declaration of war will be made by the government of the day via prerogative, 
though the format of such a declaration is not prescribed.60  Interestingly, despite appearances 
to the contrary, Britain has not been in a state of war in law since World War II61 and its last 
formal declaration was made in 1942.62  In Amin Collins J distinguished between the term 
³ZDU´LQHYHU\GD\XVDJHDQGDVDWHFKQLFDOFRQFHSW and confirmed that a legal state of war 
did not formally exist in relation to events in Iraq.63  Furthermore a recent House of Lords 
committee stated that a future formal declaration of war is µunlikely¶ due to developments in 
international law.64  The prerogative power to declare war must therefore be taken to 
encompass its modern equivalent; the power to engage in military operations despite the fact 
WKDW WKH\ PD\ QRW EH OHJDOO\ FODVVLILHG DV µwaU¶  Indeed, a 2009 government review of 
prerogatives re-labelled the power as WKH³right to make war or peace or institute hostilities 
falling short of war´65 which more closely corresponds to modern day realities. 
 
Constitutional checks upon the war prerogative have been traditionally limited.  A 
longstanding seam of caselaw indicates clear judicial reluctance to engage with such matters 
viewed as beyond the judicial role and expertise.66  However, the war prerogative may be 
regulated by Parliament in four respects.  First, Parliament can enact legislation which is 
                                                 
57
 Burmah Oil Company v Lord Advocate [1965] A.C. 75 (HL) 100. 
58
 D. Gladstone in House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, Fourth Report, 
Taming the Prerogative: Strengthening Ministerial Accountability to Parliament (2003-04 HC 422), 
Ev 4. 
59
 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Fifteenth Report, :DJLQJ:DU3DUOLDPHQW¶V
Role and Responsibility (2005-06 HL 236-I), Minutes of Evidence, Q3. 
60
 War can be commenced by either a formal declaration or by commencement of hostilities; 
+DOVEXU\¶V/DZVRIEngland (LexisNexis online), vol.3 (2011 5th edn) para.8. 
61
 Amin v Brown [2005] EWHC 1670 Ch, [2005] All ER (D) 380 (Jul). 
62
 The declaration was made against Siam (now Thailand); House of Lords Select Committee on the 
Constitution, Fifteenth Report, :DJLQJ :DU 3DUOLDPHQW¶V 5ROH DQG 5HVSRQVLELOLW\ (2005-06 HL 
236-I), para.10. 
63
 Amin v Brown [2005] EWHC 1670 Ch, [2005] All ER (D) 380 (Jul) at [17], [25], [28], [46].  See 
also: House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Fifteenth Report, Waging War: 
3DUOLDPHQW¶V5ROHDQG5HVSRQVLELOLW\ (2005-06 HL 236-I), paras 9-10.   
64
 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Fifteenth Report, :DJLQJ:DU3DUOLDPHQW¶V
Role and Responsibility (2005-06 HL 236-I), para.10. 
65
 Emphasis added.  Ministry of Justice, The Governance of Britain, Review of the Executive Royal 
Prerogative Powers: Final Report, (October 2009), Appendix, 32. 
66
 R Moosavian, Judges and High Prerogative: The Enduring Influence of Expertise and Legal Purity 
P.L. Oct [2012] 723. 
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superior to prerogative and may thus restrict or replace prerogative.67  Second, Parliament can 
scrutinise governmental exercise of prerogative via the convention of ministerial 
accountability.68  In practice, the efficacy of this constitutional check may often be diluted 
because it will be exercised retrospectively and reliant upon accurate information regarding 
government activity.  This, combined with the nebulous nature of the ministerial 
accountability convention,69 PHDQV WKDW ³the political accountability of ministers and civil 
servants to Parliament when they exercise [prerogative] powers without parliamentary 
authority is weak.´70  Two further parliamentary checks are specific to the war prerogative.  
3DUOLDPHQWDFWVDVSROLWLFDOFKHFNRQWKHSUHPLHU¶VZDUSRZHULQDWKLUGVHQVHEHFDXVHLWPXst 
approve the financing of any military action on an annual basis.71 However the strength of this 
check is undercut by the reality that a government which enjoys a parliamentary majority will 
rarely, if ever, encounter problems passing such a bill, particularly once military action is 
underway.  Finally, though parliamentary endorsement of warfare is not a legal requirement, 
its support for deployment (either express or tacit) has been generally viewed as politically 
YDOXDEOHDQG³In practice, Parliament has very frequently been consulted, or its approbation 
sought´.72  This fourth parliamentary check upon the war prerogative was crucial in the Iraq 
affair and thus warrants further detailed consideration. 
 
Parliamentary approval: an emerging convention? 
 
Despite the political importance of parliamentary support for military action, whether 
such support is required as a matter of constitutional convention was a marginal question until 
the Iraq affair raised its profile.  Conventions are the non-legal, generally unwritten norms 
that regulate the British constitution, defined by Marshall and Moodie as:  
 
³certain rules of constitutional behaviour which are considered to be binding 
by and upon those who operate the Constitution, but which are not enforced 
by the law courts, « QRU E\ WKH SUHVLGLQJ RIILFHUV LQ WKH +RXVHV RI
Parliament.´73   
 
This became a live issue during the Iraq affair arguably because public hostility to military 
action increased the need for the perceived legitimacy that parliamentary support could 
provide.  Various questions thus arose regarding the precise role of Parliament in approving 
warfare, not simply regarding the conventional status or bindingness of this check, but also its 
precise terms.  For example, was a Commons vote on the issue necessary?  Furthermore, was 
a full debate on a substantive motion required, or would 7RQ\%ODLU¶s initial preference - a 
less onerous, less risky adjournment debate - suffice?74   
                                                 
67
 R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Fire Brigades Union and others [1995] 2 
A.C. 513 (HL) 564 (Lord Mustill).  
68
 The Cabinet Office, Ministerial Code (May 2010), paras 1.2(b)-(c).  
69
 For example, Lord Wilson has conceded WKDW WKHPLQLVWHULDODFFRXQWDELOLW\FRQYHQWLRQ ³has never 
really been as clear-cut as one would like for as long as anyone can remember.´ /RUG:LOVRQRI
Dinton, ³7KH5REXVWQHVVRI&RQYHQWLRQVLQD7LPHRI0RGHUQLVDWLRQDQG&KDQJH´ [2004] P.L. 407, 
419.   
70
 A. Lester & M. Weait, ³7KH8VHRI0LQLVWHULDO3RZHUVZLWKRXW3DUOLDPHQWDU\$XWKRULW\ WKH5DP
'RFWULQH´>@3/ 415, 426. 
71
 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Fifteenth Report, :DJLQJ:DU3DUOLDPHQW¶V
Role and Responsibility (2005-06 HL 236-I), para. 14. 
72
 +DOVEXU\¶V/DZVRI(QJODQG(LexisNexis online, 2010), vol.61 (2011 5th edn) para.27.  See also: R. 
Cook, The Point of Departure, Diaries from the Front Bench (London: Pocket Books 2004) pp.187-
8.  
73
 G. Marshall & G. Moodie, Some Problems of the Constitution, 5th edn (London: Hutchinson 1971) 
pp.23-4. 
74
 R. Cook, The Point of Departure, Diaries from the Front Bench (London: Pocket Books 2004) 
pp.186-8. 
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Ultimately a Commons debate on a substantive motion to determine whether troops 
should be deployed took place on March 18th, 2003.75  Both the motion supporting war and an 
amendment tabled by opponents, which DVVHUWHGµWKHFDVHIRUZDUDJDLQVW,UDT>ZDV@QRW\HW
HVWDEOLVKHG¶, were subject to prolonged, intensive discussion.  The opposing amendment was 
voted down by a comfortable majority of 396 to 217,76 and the motion in support of war was 
then passed by 412 votes to 149 votes against.77  Despite this outcome Robin Cook, who had 
resigned his Cabinet position of Leader of the House in protest at the war, viewed the vote as 
a pyrrhic victory.  +H FODLPHG WKDW LW HVWDEOLVKHG 3DUOLDPHQW¶V ULJKW WR IRUPDOO\ YRWH RQ
warfare in the future:   
 
³Irrespective of the outcome, the very fact that a vote took place at all was a 
major advance.  For the first time in the history of Parliament, the Commons 
formally took the decision to commit Britain to conflict.  Now that the 
Commons has established its right to vote on the commitment of British troops 
to action, no future government will find it easy to take away again.´78 
 
Commentators such as Feldman,79 Tomkins80 and Cowley and Stewart81 agree that the Iraq 
vote represented an instance of parliamentary strength.  Such views were shared by some 
leading ministers in the Blair Cabinet who also saw the Iraq vote as constitutionally 
significant.  For example, iQ-DFN6WUDZFODLPHGWKDWWKHYRWHµVHWDclear precedent for 
WKHIXWXUH¶,82 and in 2005 Gordon Brown stated of Iraq:  
 
³Now that there has been a vote on these issues so clearly and in such 
controversial circumstances, I think it is unlikely, except in the most 
exceptional circumstances a government would choose not to have a vote in 
Parliament´83   
 
Though Mr Brown did not make express reference to constitutional convention in this 
passage, he stressed the importance of a parliamentary vote (bar exceptional circumstances) in 
unequivocal terms.  This emerging consensus was corroborated by a decisive development in 
May 2007 when the House of Commons debated and passed a resolution, supported by 
government, that  
 
                                                 
75
 Hansard HC Vol.401, col.824, (March 18, 2003).  See also: Hansard HC Vol.400, cols 265-367 
(February 26, 2003). 
76
 Hansard HC Vol.401, cols 902-906, (March 18, 2003).   
77
 Hansard HC Vol.401, cols 907-911, (March 18, 2003) 
78
 R. Cook, The Point of Departure, Diaries from the Front Bench (London: Pocket Books 2004) 
p.190.  HoZHYHU D  JRYHUQPHQW FRQVXOWDWLRQ SDSHU FRQWUDGLFWHG &RRN¶V FODLP WKDW WKH
VXEVWDQWLYHYRWHRQ,UDTZDVWKHILUVWVXFKYRWHLQWKHKLVWRU\RI3DUOLDPHQW³The second Iraq war 
was the first occasion since Korea in July 1950 where the House of Commons was invited to hold a 
vote on a substantive motion before armed forces were engaged.´  (PSKDVLV DGGHG  0LQLVWU\ RI
Justice, The Governance of Britain, War Powers and Treaties: Limiting Executive Powers, Cm.7239 
(2007), para.31. 
79
 Feldman has claimed: ³It is just possible that, following the parliamentary debates that preceded the 
second Gulf War in 2003, there is now a constitutional convention that no military invasion of 
another country will be initiated without parliamentary approval´  ' Feldman, ³None, One or 
6HYHUDO"3HUVSHFWLYHVRQWKH8.¶V&RQVWLWXWLRQV´&/--XO\329-351, 341. 
80
 A. Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2005) p.129. 
81
 P. Cowley & M. Stuart, ³Parliament: More Bleak House than Great Expectations´ (2004) Parl. Aff. 
Vol 57, No 2, 301-314, 312. 
82
 Emphasis added.  Quoted in House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Fifteenth Report, 
:DJLQJ:DU3DUOLDPHQW¶V5ROHDQG5HVSRQVLELOLW\ (2005-06 HL 236-I), para.98. 
83
 Quoted in House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Fifteenth Report, Waging War: 
3DUOLDPHQW¶V5ROHDQG5HVSRQVLELOLW\ (2005-06 HL 236-I), para.87. 
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³This House welcomes the precedents set by the Government in 2002 and 
2003 in seeking and obtaining the approval of the House for its decisions in 
respect of military action against Iraq; is of the view that it is inconceivable 
that any Government would in practice depart from this precedent´84   
 
,W IXUWKHUPRUH µFDOO>HG@ XSRQ JRYHUQPHQW  WR FRPH IRUZDUG ZLWK PRUH Getailed [reform] 
proposals for Parliament to consider.¶7KLVUHVROXWLRQUHSUHVHQWHG the most explicit Blair-era 
recognition that parliamentary approval is a pre-requisite to military action.   
 
3URSRVHGUHIRUPVDLPLQJWRIRUPDOLVHDQGJDOYDQLVH3DUOLDPHQW¶VLQYROYHPHQWLQWKH
war power JHUPLQDWHGLQWKHODVWWKUHH\HDUVRI0U%ODLU¶VSUHPLHUVKLSZKHQWKHZDUSRZHU
was investigated by two select committees,85  DQGZDVWKHVXEMHFWRIWKUHHSULYDWHPHPEHUV¶
bills.86  $FWLYLW\FRQWLQXHGGXULQJ*RUGRQ%URZQ¶VWHUPLQRIILFHDQG-8 witnessed the 
publication of various command papers87 culminating in a white paper and draft bill on 
constitutional renewal88 which proposed non-statutory reform of the war power by convention 
or parliamentary resolution.89  Yet despite the momentum gathered, measures to reform the 
war prerogative failed to progress further.  
 
The issue of parliamentary involvement in warfare re-emerged to prominence due to 
WKH8.¶VLQYROYHPHQWLQ/LE\DLQ  In Commons questions in the lead-up to the conflict 
the Leader of the House twice referred to prior parliamentary debate of military action as a 
µFRQYHQWLRQ¶ WKDW WKH JRYernment intended to observe.90  In the same month the Cabinet 
Secretary, Sir Gus O Donnell, wrote to a select committee confirming that  
 
³WKH *RYHUQPHQW EHOLHYHV WKDW VLQFH «WKH GHSOR\PHQW RI WURRSV LQ ,UDT D
convention exists that Parliament will be given the opportunity to debate the 
decision to commit troops to armed conflict´91   
 
Significantly, a full parliamentary debate and vote on a substantive motion supporting 
engagement in Libya was held, reinforcing the Iraq vote as a constitutional precedent.  
Though this did not occur until March 21st, two days after the actual order to engage, military 
action was overwhelmingly approved.92  Towards the end of the debate Foreign Secretary 
:LOOLDP+DJXHVWDWHG³:HZLOO«HQVKULQH LQ ODZIRU WKH IXWXUH WKHQHFHVVity of consulting 
                                                 
84
 Hansard HC Vol.460, col.582 (May 15, 2007). 
85
 House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, Fourth Report, Taming the 
Prerogative: Strengthening Ministerial Accountability to Parliament (2003-04 HC 422); House of 
Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Fifteenth Report, :DJLQJ:DU3DUOLDPHQW¶V5ROHDQG
Responsibility (2005-06 HL 236-I). 
86
 Full details are set out in House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Fifteenth Report, 
:DJLQJ:DU3DUOLDPHQW¶V5ROHDQG5HVSRQVLELOLW\ (2005-06 HL 236-I), para.80. 
87
 0LQLVWU\ RI -XVWLFH 7KH *RYHUQDQFH RI %ULWDLQ &P   0U %URZQ¶V DFFRPSDQ\LQJ
parliamentary speech proposed that the war prerogative was one particular area that warranted 
reform: Hansard HC Vol.462, cols.815-6 (July 3, 2007).  Ministry of Justice, The Governance of 
Britain, War Powers and Treaties: Limiting Executive Powers, Cm.7239 (2007). 
88
 Ministry of Justice, The Governance of Britain ± Constitutional Renewal, Cm.7342-I & II (2008).  
89
 Ministry of Justice, The Governance of Britain ± Constitutional Renewal, Cm.7342-II (2008) 
para.215 and Annex A, 53. 
90
 Hansard HC Vol.524, col.1066 (March 10, 2011). 
91
 Emphasis added.  House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Eighth 
Report, 3DUOLDPHQW¶V5ROHLQ&RQIOLFW'HFLVLRQV (2010-12 HC 923), para. 3.  See also the letter from 
the Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform featured in House of Commons Political and 
Constitutional Reform Committee, Twelfth Report, 3DUOLDPHQW¶V5ROHLQ&RQIOLFW'HFLVLRQV± further 
Government Response (2010-12 HC 1673), 3.  
92
 557 M.P.s voted in support of the military action and 13 voted against; Hansard HC Vol.525, cols 
699-802 (March 21, 2011). 
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Parliament on military action´93  Two months later the Political and Constitutional Reform 
select committee recommended that government re-instigate Brown-era war power reform 
proposals.94 This resulted in relevant amendments to the new Cabinet Manual,95 but no 
parliamentary resolution to date.96  Such recent activity indicates that war prerogative reform 
is likely to be an ongoing issue as long as UK foreign policy includes instances of military 
engagement overseas. 
 
In summary, the post-Iraq period witnessed a crystallisation of the view that the war 
prerogative needed reform, though the proliferation of parliamentary activity has not yet 
yielded any formal changes to this area.  But even in the absence of such reform the evidence 
does tilt towards an emerging consensus, by no means unanimous,97  that a convention 
requiring express parliamentary approval for deployment does now exist.  In any event there 
was ultimately a shift towards more concrete parliamentary involvement regarding warfare 
decisions.  Parliamentary involvement in war has traditionally been politically expedient.  
However, by moving towards more express statements of the position and potentially 
extending approval to require a substantive vote, the nature of parliamentary involvement 
arguably changed.  Parliament emerged as a stronger potential check on the prime ministerial 
war prerogative and this trend constituted a key development during the Iraq affair and the 
period that followed it.  
 
Yet despite the apparent strengthening of parliamentary checks on the war power 
yielded by the Iraq affair, the March 2003 vote ultimately approved military action and thus 
HQGRUVHG WKH 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU¶V SUHIHUUHG H[HUFLVH RI WKH ZDU SRZHU  This outcome, 
particularly in light of strong opposition that prevailed at the time, arguably indicates that the 
practical significance of the Iraq vote may have been limited and that Parliament¶VLQFUHDVHG
involvement should not be overstated.  Instead, the efficacy of this strengthening check on the 
war prerogative should be viewed in light of three vital constitutional realities.  First, the 
executive can control Parliament by virtue of its party majority in the Commons; this was 
particularly the case in the first two terms of the Blair government that enjoyed comfortable 
majorities.98  Second, under existing constitutional arrangements there will always be a need 
for individual leadership in warfare and the Prime Minister remains the one individual with 
direct access to the war power because he has the exclusive capacity to advise the Monarch 
regarding use of the war power at law.  This point is recognised by Mr Blair who has written 
RI,UDT³here is the difference between everyone else and the final decision-taker.  Everyone 
else can debate and assume; only one person decides.´99  Finally, and most significant for the 
purposes of this article, PDUOLDPHQW¶V HIILFDF\ DV D FKHFN in the Iraq vote was discreetly 
                                                 
93
 Hansard HC Vol.525, col.799 (March 21, 2011). 
94
 7KH FRPPLWWHH VSHFLILFDOO\ DGYLVHG JRYHUQPHQW WR µEULQJ forward a draft detailed parliamentary 
UHVROXWLRQIRUFRQVXOWDWLRQ¶ and include WKHµFRQYHQWLRQ¶ in the Cabinet Manual; House of Commons 
Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Eighth Report, 3DUOLDPHQW¶V 5ROH LQ &RQIOLFW
Decisions (2010-12 HC 923), paras 3, 6.  See also: House of Commons Political and Constitutional 
Reform Committee, Ninth Report, 3DUOLDPHQW¶V5ROHLQ&RQIOLFW'HFLVLRQV*RYHUQPHQWResponse to 
WKH&RPPLWWHH¶V(LJKWh Report of Session 2010-12 (2010-12 HC 1477). 
95
 The Cabinet Office, The Cabinet Manual (1st edition, October 2011), paras 5.36-5.38. 
96
  This led the select committee to claim WKDWµSURJUHVVLVRYHUGXH¶ on this matter.  House of Commons 
Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Twelfth Report, 3DUOLDPHQW¶V 5ROH LQ &RQIOLFW
Decisions ± further Government Response (2010-12 HC 1673), para.7. 
97
 For example, N. White and D. Jenkins do not think such a convention exists and S. Payne thinks that 
it may do: House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Eighth Report, 
3DUOLDPHQW¶V5ROHLQ&RQIOLFW'HFLVLRQV (2010-12 HC 923), Ev 15-16, Q38. 
98
 In the 1997 eOHFWLRQ WKH /DERXU 3DUW\ ZRQ  VHDWV LQ WKH +RXVH RI &RPPRQV D µODQGVOLGH¶
majority of 179).  In the 2001 election Labour won 413 seats (maintaining a very comfortable 
majority of 165).  In 2005 the government won 356 seats and saw the Commons majority reduced to 
67. 
99
 T. Blair, A Journey (London: Arrow Books 2011) p.405. 
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undermined by countervailing constitutional features, specifically clusters of Crown-based 
prime ministerial prerogatives which, exercised cumulatively, steered the Iraq vote in favour 
of deployment.  The precise mechanics of this process are discussed in the third and final part 
of this article.    
 
 
[3] Gauging the Influence of Crown-based Prerogatives upon the 
Iraq Vote 
 
 
Despite their ancient roots prerogative powers continue to be integral to modern 
British Prime Ministers.  As Part one established, the office provides its incumbent with de 
facto access to a range of prerogative powers necessary to undertake the role, including for 
example Cabinet chairmanship, patronage and (until the Constitutional Reform and 
Governance Act 2010) authority over the civil service.  However, three specific prime 
ministerial prerogatives impacted upon parliamentary involvement in the Iraq deployment 
decision: first, the power to appoint ministers; second, to request a dissolution of Parliament; 
and third, to defend the realm.  It is to the influence of these three powers upon the Iraq vote 
that discussion now turns. 
 
Power to Appoint Cabinet Ministers  
 
Constitutionally, it is the MRQDUFK¶VSURSHUUROHWRDSSRLQWPLQLVWHUV\HWFRQYHQWLRQ
dictates that sKH PXVW H[HUFLVH WKLV SUHURJDWLYH DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU¶V
recommendations.100  Therefore, indirectly, this prerogative allows a Prime Minister almost 
complete control over the personnel of his Cabinet.  It allows the office holder the technical 
FDSDFLW\ WRDSSRLQWDQGGLVPLVV&DELQHWPLQLVWHUVDWZLOO UHIOHFWLQJ³the legal position that 
Ministers are appointed and hold office at the pleasure of the Crown.´101    In a wider context, 
the power of government appointments ensures the Prime Minister solid House of Commons 
support of at least 95 of his ministers102 who are obliged to support government policy by 
virtue of the convention of collective responsibility.103  Despite practical and political 
UHVWUDLQWV XSRQ LW WKH SUHPLHU¶V SRZHU WR DSSRLQW and dismiss Cabinet ministers clearly 
affords a position of relative predominance vis-a-vis his party in Parliament and individual 
Cabinet ministers, though the strength of this hegemony will vary according to political 
climates and alliances.  Key ministers in the Iraq affair included the Foreign Secretary Jack 
Straw, Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon and, vitally, the Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith.  
All three ministers had been appointed by Mr Blair and played significant roles in the 
decision to undertake military action.   
 
Mr Blair appointed Lord Peter Goldsmith to the post of Attorney General in 2001.  
The Attorney General is a government minister,104 though his role can be divided into two 
categories of duty: legal and ministerial.105  7KHRIILFHKDVµWUDGLWLRQDOO\EHHQDWWKHMXQFWLRQ
                                                 
100
 +DOVEXU\¶V/DZVRI(QJODQG (LexisNexis online), vol.8(2) (2011 reissue) para.21. 
101
 R. Brazier, Ministers of the Crown (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1997) p.205. 
102
 The House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975, ss.2(1)-(2) indirectly prevents the appointment 
of more than 95 ministers by providing that if the number of ministers exceeds this threshold the 
excess shall not be entitled to vote in the Commons.   
103
 The Cabinet Office, Ministerial Code (May 2010), paras 2.1, 2.3. 
104
 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Seventh Report, Reform of the Office of 
Attorney General (2007-8 HL 93), paras 8-9. 
105
 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Seventh Report, Reform of the Office of 
Attorney General (2007-8 HL 93), para.22. 
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RI ODZ DQG SROLWLFV LQ (QJODQG DQG :DOHV¶106 and a Commons select committee identified 
UHVXOWLQJµWHQVLRQV¶LQWKLVGXDOUROH107  One of the Attorney-General¶VSULPDU\RIILFLDOGXWLHV
is legal adviser to the Crown;108 this formal role in the Iraq affair required Lord Goldsmith to 
specifically advise government regarding the international lawfulness of military action.  This 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\LVµQRQ-PLQLVWHULDO¶LVµQRWVXEMHFWWRFROOHFWLYHUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶DQGUHTXLUHVWKH
Attorney-General WR µDFW LQGHSHQGHQWO\ RI WKH *RYHUQPHQW¶109  However in evidence to a 
House of Lords committee, Jowell questioned whether such independence on the part of an 
Attorney is possible when his role as a member of government is at least partly political,110 a 
particularly salient question in the context of Iraq. 
 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorisation was required for an 
internationally lawful UK-US deployment in Iraq.  There were conflicting views amongst 
member states as to whether UNSC Resolution 1441,111 passed in November 2002, provided 
such authorisation.  UK attempts to obtain UN support for a second resolution explicitly 
authorising military action were ultimately unsuccessful112 and the lack of a second UN 
resolution caused domestic problems for Mr Blair.  At a meeting on February 28th, 2003 the 
Attorney-General initially provided advice to the Prime Minister regarding the legality of 
undertaking military action without a second UN resolution, advice later confirmed in a 
formal minute on March, 7th.113  The Attorney-*HQHUDO¶V LQLWLDO DGYLFH RQ WKLV LVVXH ZDV
qualified and reticent about military action, concluding that ³there would be no justification 
for the use of force against Iraq on the grounds of self-defence against an imminent threat.´114  
Though Lord *ROGVPLWKDFFHSWHGWKDWµDUHDVRQDEOHFDVH¶FRXOGEHPDGHWKDWPLOLWDU\DFWLRQ
would be authorised without a second resolution, he made a vital qualification to this point.  
The qualification was this; that proceeding without a second resolution and relying solely on 
UNSC Resolutions 678115 and 1441  
 
³will only be sustainable if there are strong factual grounds for concluding 
that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity [to comply].  In other words, 
we would need to be able to demonstrate hard evidence of non-compliance 
and non-co-operation´116   
                                                 
106
 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Seventh Report, Reform of the Office of 
Attorney General (2007-8 HL 93), para.1. 
107
 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Seventh Report, Reform of the Office of 
Attorney General (2007-8 HL 93), para.55. 
108
 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Seventh Report, Reform of the Office of 
Attorney General (2007-8 HL 93), paras 4-5.  See also: House of Constitutional Affairs Committee, 
Fifth Report, Constitutional Role of the Attorney General (2006-7 HC 306), paras 11, 68. 
109
 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Seventh Report, Reform of the Office of 
Attorney General (2007-8 HL 93), para.9.   
110
 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Seventh Report, Reform of the Office of 
Attorney General (2007-8 HL 93), paras 32-33.  Elsewhere, Jowell expresses support for an 
independent, non-party Attorney General: Public Administration Select Committee, Tenth Report, 
Constitutional Renewal: Draft Bill and White Paper (2007-08 HC 499), para.83.   
111
 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 ((November 8, 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1441). 
112
 A. Seldon, Blair 591-3 (London: Free Press 2005) pp.591-3; D. Coates & J. Kreiger, %ODLU¶V:DU 
(Cambridge: Policy Press 2004) pp.40-1; J. Kampfner, %ODLU¶V :DUV (London: Free Press 2004) 
pp.286-7.  
113
 Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors (chair: Lord Butler), Review of Intelligence on 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, (July 2004, HC 898), para.378. 
114
 Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors (chair: Lord Butler), Review of Intelligence on 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, (July 2004, HC 898), para.374.  
115
 United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 ((November 29, 1990) UN Doc S/RES/678). 
116
 R (on the application of Gentle and another) v Prime Minister and others [2006] EWCA Civ 1689, 
[2007] QB 689 (CA) at [16].  The Attorney General¶VDGYLFHFRQWLQXHG³you will need to consider 
carefully whether the evidence of non-cooperation and non-compliance by Iraq is sufficiently 
compelling to justify the conclusion that Iraq has failed to take its final opportunity.´ 
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This initially private advice was later publicised in the Butler Report.117 
 
On March 11th, the Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, indicated to 
the Prime Minister that the international lawfulness of any military action must be clearly 
confirmed before he could order forces to take action.118  Vitally the Attorney General later 
changed his opinion regarding the international legality of military action.  On March 17th, 
days after his initially sceptical advice, the Attorney-General produced advice indicating an 
alternative legal view.119  His new advice (drafted by Professor Christopher Greenwood)120 
FRQWDLQHGQRQHRILWVHDUOLHUTXDOLILFDWLRQVDQGFODLPHGWKDWµthe authority to use force under 
[earlier UNSC] resolution 678 has revived and so continues today¶121  0U%ODLU¶VPHPRLUV
do obliquely acknowledge Lord GoldsmiWK¶V change of advice, but do not provide a detailed, 
specific explanation for it.122  This new µadvice¶ was provided to Cabinet,123 the Information 
Tribunal later commenting WKDW³it may have been that members of Cabinet without a legal 
background were inclinHG WR UHO\ RQ WKH $WWRUQH\¶V >VKRUWHU DQG PRUH FHUWDLQ@ DGYLFH´124  
Vitally, it was also /RUG *ROGVPLWK¶V DPHQGHG DGYLFH XSRQ ZKLFK 3DUOLDPHQW YRWHG WR
approve war on March 18th. 
 
/RUG*ROGVPLWK¶V u-turn in legal advice has proved controversial and, in the words of 
WKH+RXVHRI/RUGV&RQVWLWXWLRQDO6HOHFW&RPPLWWHH³WKHGLIIHUHQFHV>LQDGYLFH@«JDYHULVH
to speculation that the Attorney had been placed under political pressure to temper his 
RSLQLRQWRDOLJQLWZLWKWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VLQWHQWLRQV´125  It is therefore arguable that the Prime 
0LQLVWHU¶V de facto prerogative power to appoint the Attorney General as a minister of his 
government may have played a discernible role in enabling him to secure the deployment of 
troops in Iraq (which was entirely reliant upon a clear statement of legality).  Mr Blair may 
                                                 
117
 Though the government initially opposed the release of this information; Peter Hennessy, 
Informality and Circumscription: The Blair Style of Government in War and Peace, Political 
Quarterly, 2005, Vol. 76(1), p.3, 8.  
118
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119
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Iraq, and the Misuse of Power (London: Free Press 2005) p.174; P. Sands QC, Lawless World 
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121
 Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors (chair: Lord Butler), Review of Intelligence on 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, (July 2004, HC 898), Annex D, 182.  For a detailed critique of the 
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 3 6DQGV 4& Lawless World (London: Penguin 2006) 
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October 14, 2003) <http://www.justice.org.uk/data/files/resources/164/Iraq-the-pax-Americana-and-
the-law.pdf> accessed June 15, 2013.  
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 T. Blair, A Journey (London: Arrow Books 2011) pp.421-3, 432. 
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 Cabinet Office & Dr. Christopher Lamb v Information Commissioner, EA/2008/0024 & 0029 
(27/01/2009) at [21]-[23]. 
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have been able to exert influence or persuasion to ensure that Lord Goldsmith produced legal 
advice in support of his preferred exercise of the war prerogative.   
 
The controversy surrounding the Attorney GHQHUDO¶VDGYLFH LQ WKH,UDTGHFLVLRQKDV
been cited as one event which has highlighted inadequacies in the post.126   Reforms to the 
office were proposed in the post-Blair era,127 though statutory measures were ultimately 
abandoned and non-legal reforms to the office were modest.128  Proposed reforms to the war 
prerogative also entailed discussion of changes to the A-G role and whether his legal advice 
regarding warfare should be routinely published.129  That such attention has focussed upon 
reform of this area supports the proposition that this was a material factor which enabled the 
Iraq deployment. 
 
Power to Request a Dissolution of Parliament 
 
Until the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act 2011 (FTPA) placed the dissolution of 
Parliament on a statutory footing130 it was a monarchic prerogative power.  Through his 
power to advise the Monarch to dissolve Parliament, a Prime Minister was previously able to 
determine the date of general elections, subject only to the statutory requirement that the 
maximum duration of Parliament was five years.131  The new Act removes this discretion, 
fixing at five yearly intervals both general elections132and the accompanying prior 
parliamentary dissolution.133  At the time of the Iraq vote the power to advise a dissolution 
under prerogative belonged to the Prime Minister solely.134  The chief advantage of this power 
was that it allowed a Prime Minister to instigate a general election at a time most 
advantageous to his party.  The dissolution decision was thus inevitably made predominantly 
on party political grounds which prompted calls for its reform,135 though ironically the 
insecurities of coalition government ultimately proved a stronger impetus to change.   
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 House of Constitutional Affairs Committee, Fifth Report, Constitutional Role of the Attorney 
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University Press 1997) p.102. 
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sought: Ministry of Justice, The Governance of Britain, Cm.7170 (2007), para. 35.  See also: Robert 
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Interestingly, the prerogative power to advise a dissolution also came to act as a 
method of prime ministerial restraint over his own parliamentary party or in %ODFNEXUQ¶V
WHUPVDV³a sort of penal power that a Prime Minister has over his colleagues by threatening 
a Dissolution if WKH\GRQ¶WVXSSRUWKLP´136  Its function as a disciplinary mechanism stemmed 
from its interaction with the constitutional convention that a Prime Minister will resign if he 
loses a vote of confidence in the Commons,137 thus potentially instigating the dissolution of 
Parliament and resulting general election.  The process would start with the House of 
Commons debating and voting upon a motion of no confidence.  Yet what constitutes a no 
FRQILGHQFH µPRWLRQ¶ LVQRWFOHDU-cut; 138 it can take various forms, for example a vote upon 
NH\ OHJLVODWLRQ ZKLFK HQDFWV SDUW RI D JRYHUQPHQW¶V manifesto, a Budget or another 
fundamental issue.   
 
If the government or Prime Minister lost such a vote of confidence this would result in one of 
two outcomes.  Historic precedent indicates it was most probable that a dissolution of 
Parliament would be advised: 
 
³There have only been three successful votes of no confidence since the start 
of the 20th century.  On the last two occasions, the government announced the 
dissolution of Parliament on the following day (October 1924 and March 
1979).´139   
 
Alternatively, the losing premier or government could resign, but if a new government 
commanding majority support in Parliament could not be formed then dissolution would 
follow in any event.  Either way, government loss of a no confidence vote would very likely 
lead to a general election.  In this way the dissolution device could be used as a potential last-
resort sanction against party dissent because the threat of dissolution at an inopportune 
moment with the resulting potential to lose their parliamentary seats would often compel 
backbenchers to follow the government line.  Labour Prime Minister Clement Atlee stated 
WKDW WKRXJK WKH SRZHU ZDV UDUHO\ UHVRUWHG WR LW ZDV µHVVHQWLDO¶ WR SDUW\ GLVFLSOLQH140  
However, the threat of its use also entailed an inherent risk for the premier who chose to 
resort to it. 
 
,Q OLJKWRIWKH%ODLUJRYHUQPHQW¶VODUJH&RPPRQV majorities, particularly in its first 
two terms, there was little recourse to the dissolution power other than for scheduled general 
elections.  This was because government could draw upon support from a large pool of 
Labour M.P.s to pass its legislative programme.  But the dissolution device was a material 
factor in the Commons debate regarding Iraq.  According to his memoirs, Mr Blair was 
keenly aware that without a second UNSC resolution he could lose the vote and have to 
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resign.141  Though this was not a formal confidence vote per se WKHHIIHFWRI WKHSUHPLHU¶V
pre-vote claim that he would resign in the event of losing142 was almost identical in practical 
terms; defeat in that vote would have obliged Mr Blair to either fulfil his threat or almost 
certainly IDFHDµQRFRQILGHQFH¶motion.  His memoirs explain the risk in the following terms:  
 
³I would need Tory votes to be sure of winning [the Iraq vote] in the House of 
&RPPRQV«6R,NQHZI would win the [Iraq] vote itself.  But ± and it was a 
ELJµEXW¶± the Tories were, perfectly justifiably, making it clear that if there 
ZDV D µQR FRQILGHQFH¶ PRWLRQ IROORZLQJ WKH YRWH RQ WKH FRQIOLFW WKHQ WKH\
would side with the rebels.  In that case, I would be out.  Therefore I had to 
win well, and in a way that deterred my own side taking their opposition as far 
DVDJUHHLQJ>WR@YRWHDJDLQVWJRYHUQPHQWRQDµQRFRQILGHQFH¶PRWLRQ´143  
 
In this sense, like a formal confidence vote, 0U%ODLU¶VUHVLJQDWLRQWKUHDW acted to unite party 
interests against the political fallout of a general election that would very probably occur in 
the event of a negative vote against deployment.  Labour M.P.s voting on whether to approve 
military action in Iraq did so in the knowledge that failure to provide such approval would 
result in the resignation of Mr Blair and his government or, failing this, the passing of a 
motion of no confidence against them.  Either outcome would very probably result in the 
dissolution of Parliament and a general election whilst the Labour Party was in disarray.  
Evidence from the March 18th debate indicates that the potentially fatal effect of such an 
outcome was arguably a factor influencing the debate and vote. 
 
The Iraq debate was not conducted along strict party lines and the deployment was 
supported by many Conservative M.P.s.  A number of Labour members including Malcolm 
Savidge,144 John McDonnell145, Barry Gardiner146 and Lindsay Hoyle147 made speeches 
emphasising that the deployment vote should transcend party and career interests.  
Nevertheless, the Blair government conducted extensive background negotiations to build up 
Commons support prior to the vote148 and references to its utilisation of the Whip system were 
made by Malcolm Savidge149 and John McDonnell in the debate.  The latter stated:  
 
³The Prime Minister said that he wants people to vote not out of loyalty but on 
the basis of understanding and supporting the argument.  I respect him for 
that.  I would respect him even more if he gave us a free vote instead of a 
three-line Whip, and if the Whips were called off from trying to persuade 
SHRSOHLQWKHLUQRUPDOPDQQHU´150 
 
Other references to the impact of the Iraq vote on the future of the Labour government were 
made in the debate.  Labour M.P. Bill Tynan (supporting the amendment against government) 
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DFNQRZOHGJHGWKDWWKLVZDVDQLVVXHXSRQZKLFKWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHUFRXOGEHµGLVSODFHG¶151  
Similarly Labour M.P. Peter Pike (supporting the amendment) expressed concern that a vote 
against deployment would damage the Prime Minister, government and party.152  Elsewhere 
Conservative M.P. Sir Patrick Cormack (supporting deployment) asked Labour M.P. Tony 
Banks (voting against) the following question:  
 
³Does he accept that the logical consequence of his vote this evening, whether 
or not he regards it as a rebel vote, would be the defeat of his Prime 
Minister?´153 
 
This evidence from the Iraq debate indicates that express references to the potentially 
fatal impact upon the Labour Party of failure to approve warfare were made at various points.  
Additionally, Cowley and Stuart claim this issue was laboured in background negotiations 
with Labour M.P.s prior to the vote.154  This suggests that the threat of dissolution was present 
as an influencing factor, though it did not occupy a major explicit role in the debate.  
Nevertheless the silent, underlying role of the dissolution device upon the Labour M.P.s 
cannot be discounted.  ,WUHPDLQVDUJXDEOHWKDW0U%ODLU¶Vthreat to resign and instigate the µQR
confidence-dissolution-election¶ process constituted a further factor in favour of his preferred 
exercise of the war power.  By enabling the Prime Minister to mobilise support for war, it 
acted as another device which curtailed the vigour of countervailing parliamentary checks 
upon the power.  Dissolution was a power that the premier could previously threaten to use in 
order to unite party interests in extraordinary circumstances and thus it could assist him to 
obtain approval for controversial or politically unpopular measures.  Despite the ongoing 
disagreements within the Labour party regarding military action in Iraq, the threat of an 
impending general election increased the stakes and was influential in bringing dissenting or 
reluctant factions into line.   
 
The Blair-era dissolution prerogative should be viewed in light of subsequent reforms 
introduced by the FTPA7KRXJKLWKDVDEROLVKHGWKH0RQDUFK¶VGLVVROXWLRQSUHURJDWLYHDQG
WKXVWKHSUHPLHU¶VFRQWURORYHULW WKH$FWOHDYHVWKHJHQHUDOPechanics of a no confidence-
triggered dissolution largely unaltered.155  So the essential features of the dissolution device, 
traditionally founded upon autocratic leadership and the ancient Crown-based framework, 
remain intact.  A prime ministerial threat of resignation, of the sort made by Mr Blair prior to 
the Iraq vote, would play out in a very similar way under the FTPA and thus the potential 
influence of the dissolution device on a parliamentary warfare decision continues.  There are 
clearly important reasons for keeping this device intact, for example ensuring that a 
government discredited on a vital issue does not remain in power.  However, the executive-
favoured inclination of the device in warfare decisions, which due to their importance are 
supposed to transcend party and partisanship, should be acknowledged and arguably afforded 
further attention.  
 
The Defence Prerogative  
 
The power to engage in military action under the foreign affairs prerogative can be 
distinguished from the actual day-to-day conduct of military action which is governed by 
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statute and the general prerogative to defend the realm.156  The prerogative to defend the 
4XHHQ¶VUHDOPIUHTXHQWO\FLWHGDVWKH&URZQ
VIRUHPRVWGXW\157 puts the Prime Minister and 
his Defence Secretary in contURORIWKHQDWLRQ¶VPLOLWDU\IRUFHV  +DOVEXU\¶VVWDWHVWKDW 
 
³The supreme government and command of all forces by sea, land and air, 
and of all defence establishments is vested in the Crown by prerogative right 
at common law and by statute´158 
 
The prerogative authorises decisions about military appointments, the grouping and disposal 
of military units and matters regarding the organisation, personnel and maintenance of 
military forces.159  Parliamentary limitations on the defence prerogative include the annual 
approval of defence budgets by Armed Forces Acts as well as the general scrutiny of a 
parliamentary select committee.160   
 
At the time of the parliamentary vote to approve military action in Iraq British troops 
had already been deployed and were waiting for the order to enter the country.  Thus the 
initial conduct of military action can be divided into two distinct stages: first the preparatory 
action of deploying troops in readiness for potential combat where necessary, and secondly 
the order to actively engage in combat.  This second stage, the order to commence warfare, is 
specifically authorised the µZDU¶prerogative.  However, the former preparatory action would 
be authorised by the defence prerogative which covers operational matters. 
 
The prior mobilisation of UK troops in the Iraq affair was by no means an unusual or 
unlawful use of prerogative.  The Defence Secretary justified this advance deployment on two 
grounds: first, the scale of the proposed military action required prior marshalling of troops,161 
and second, the clear threat of force was necessary to afford the UK and US leverage in 
ongoing negotiations with the Iraqi regime.162  Parliamentary approval was not required for 
this initial preparatory deployment, though general statements were made to Parliament in 
January 2003 outlining the ongoing arrangements.163  Yet vitally, it is arguable that this 
exercise of the defence prerogative to arrange troops at the Iraqi border (combined with the 
timing of the vote)164 had a discernible impact upon the parliamentary debate because it 
increased pressure on M.P.s to approve military action.  Evidence from the March 18th debate 
indicates support for this proposition. 
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In the debate Liberal Democrat M.P. Michael Moore argued that the presence of 
troops waiting on the Iraqi border should not influence a vote in favour of war.165  Yet other 
PHPEHUV¶VWDWHPHQWVVXJJHVWWKDWWKLVZDVLQGHHGDIDFWRU, and references to the fact that the 
army was awaiting orders were made by a number of M.P.s over the course of the debate.166  
The speeches of four M.P.s who supported the war particularly demonstrate the influence of 
the prior deployment of troops.  Conservative M.P. Sir Patrick Cormack specifically raised 
the impact on servicemen and women of the failure to obtain a yes vote.167  Labour M.P. 
Hugh Bayley also mentioned this as a reason favouring war.168  The preparatory deployment 
featured more prominently in the speech of Labour M.P. Donald Anderson who encapsulated 
the heightened stakes in the following terms:  
 
³We are faced with this problem as we seek to come to a decision: should we 
now stand down our troops, and should we fundamentally change our 
strategy?  In theory, we could indeed fold our tents and glide away, forgetting 
about the fact that there are men and women representing our country on the 
borders of Kuwait and Iraq. ... To withdraw at this stage would be 
unthinkable. ... We cannot easily turn back without undermining our own 
credibility and the authority of the United Nations.´169 
 
A final example is provided by Conservative M.P. John Maples who in similar terms 
summarised the consequences of a no-vote thus: 
 
³If on the verge of battle ... [our troops] were withdrawn, that would destroy 
the credibility of British foreign and security policy for a generation. ... We 
would damage immensely, if not terminally, our alliance with the United 
States´170 
 
On the basis of this evidence it appears that an influential factor in the debate was the 
SRWHQWLDO LQWHUQDWLRQDO GDPDJH WR WKH 8.¶V UHSXWDWLRQ DQG LQWHUHVWV LI WURRSV RQ the Iraqi 
border were incapacitated by a negative parliamentary vote and forced to return to their bases.  
In this sense it appears that ministerial exercise of the defence prerogative to arrange troops in 
UHDGLQHVV IRU DFWLRQGLG IDFLOLWDWH WKHSUHPLHU¶V preferred exercise of the war prerogative to 
engage in warfare (whether this was intentional or not).  Exercising the defence prerogative in 
this way, combined with the timing of the vote, constituted a further factor pressurising M.P.s 
to vote in favour of war.171  This factor was one of a number which undermined the potential 
VWUHQJWKRIWKHSDUOLDPHQWDU\YRWHWRDFWDVDQHIIHFWLYHFKHFNRQ0U%ODLU¶VZDUSRZHU 
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Conclusion 
 
 
It is apparent that the Crown is not just a curious abstraction hovering above the 
working constitution, but may have real, practical influence on present-day issues of the 
utmost importance.  This article demonstrates its current significance in two related respects.  
First, in general, the Crown continues to form the legal foundation of modern prime 
ministerial power.  The Crown, and its associated notions of monarch, thus remains a subtle 
but powerful influence in the prime ministerial war power legally, structurally and culturally.  
The inherent symbiosis between premier and Crown KDV OHG ZDU WR EHFRPH µDQ LQWHQVHO\
SULPHPLQLVWHULDODFWLYLW\¶172 where once it was an intensely monarchical activity.   
 
Second, the modern significance of the Crown is specifically demonstrated in the Iraq 
affair; it shows that the Crown-based legal framework played an underlying but vital role in 
enabling the engagement of troops in March 2003.  Its effects were indirect, even covert, but 
tangible nonetheless.  Evidence suggests there was a clear shift towards more concrete 
parliamentary involvement in the exercise of the war prerogative up to, and particularly 
following, the Iraq decision.  But, as that decision shows, the effectiveness of this newly 
strengthened parliamentary check may be undercut by countervailing constitutional features 
including the party majority enjoyed by government, the Whip system and, significantly, a 
cluster of prime ministerial prerogatives that stem from the RIILFH¶V FRORQLVDWLRQ RI WKH
Crown.  Cumulatively these prerogatives enabled Mr Blair to exert an influence over the 
parliamentary Iraq vote and therefore weighted the process in favour of deployment.  The 
3ULPH 0LQLVWHU¶V de facto power to appoint government ministers, including the Attorney 
*HQHUDOZDVDPDWHULDOIDFWRUWKDWIDFLOLWDWHG0U%ODLU¶VSUHIHUUHGXVHRIWKHZDr prerogative 
regarding Iraq; his position in relation to the Attorney at the very least appears to have played 
a discernible role in enabling him to secure the legal advice essential for deployment.  
Furthermore, Mr Blair utilised the right to advise a dissolution of Parliament as a disciplinary 
device over his party in the Iraq vote which acted to heighten the stakes for Labour M.P.s.  
Finally, a further factor assisting Mr Blair to obtain parliamentary approval for engagement in 
Iraq was the exercise of the defence prerogative to deploy troops on the Iraqi border in 
advance in readiness for combat.  Evidence from the parliamentary debate indicates that such 
exercise of both the dissolution and defence powers were further factors increasing pressure 
on M.PVWRYRWHLQIDYRXURIZDU,QWKLVVHQVHWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶VFRORQLVDWLRQRI&URZQ
SRZHUV DLGHG 0U %ODLU¶V H[HUFLVH of the war prerogative despite the doubt and strength of 
opposition to deployment.  It did this by providing the premier with a range of powers that 
enabled political resistance to be tamed or evaded and the parliamentary vote to be 
influenced. In doing so, it correspondingly undermined the vote as a substantive check on the 
war power.   
 
Beyond the Iraq affair, it seems likely that the CURZQ¶Vpotential influence in this area 
will prevail in the foreseeable future.  Despite its importance to modern prime ministerial 
power and warfare decisions, the Crown itself is largely neglected as an issue ripe for reform.  
This is partly because it is generally viewed as an abstract concept removed from the practical 
realities of modern government.  Additionally, it has come to be supplemented by legal-
constitutional concepts (such as conventions and parliamentary sovereignty) which arguably 
act as reDVVXULQJ IDFDGHV RU LQ :DUG¶V WHUPV µP\WKV¶173  These allow the academic 
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community to congratulate the democratic and accountable aspects of the British constitution 
whilst marginalising the autocratic, monarchical legal structures which may discreetly act to 
negate or undermine the apparently progressive features of the constitution.  In a 
parliamentary context the Crown has been similarly ignored.  The post-Iraq era has witnessed 
an array of actual or proposed reforms, with select committee cross-hairs focussed upon areas 
including the war power and wider prerogative, the role of Attorney-General and even the 
prime ministerial office itself.174  So the constitutional failures of the Iraq affair have 
generated some modest, incremental adjustments in response to specific problems.  But 
vitally, such attention has not extended to the Crown itself.  Piecemeal reforms that leave the 
Crown untouched, unquestioned and its essential mechanics intact may ultimately prove less 
than meaningful because its potential to facilitate undue prime ministerial influence over 
3DUOLDPHQW¶VVFUXWLQ\RIKLVRZQZDUIDUHGHFLVLRQUHPDLQV 
 
Ultimately one must question whether the continuing influence of the medieval, 
authoritarian Crown is justifiable in, or compatible with, a modern democratic polity.  The 
Iraq vote demonstrates that a Prime Minister, using the Crown-based powers of monarchs of 
old, can manoeuvre a vital parliamentary vote, arguably stripping the vote of some of its 
meaning and justifying the later concerns of the House of Lords Constitutional Select 
Committee.175  These prerogatives were all longstanding constitutional features that had been 
utilised by premiers in the past.  However, the specific combination in which they operated 
and their cumulative effect in the Iraq decision was arguably unique and unprecedented.  In 
WKLV UHVSHFW WKH ,UDT DIIDLU DUJXDEO\ KLJKOLJKWV D µGHPRFUDWLF GHILFLW¶176 regarding warfare 
decisions at national level.  Evidence shows that the decision was made in disregard of the 
views of the British populace by a small isolated elite and with limited input or meaningful 
scrutiny from Cabinet or Parliament.  The following claim by Gladstone encapsulates the 
position cogently: 
 
³,I LW VHFXUHV QR RWKHU %ULWLVK QDWLRQDO LQWHUHVW WKH ,UDT µZDU¶ KDV DZRken 
millions of British subjects to their powerlessness in the face of [Lord 
5RVNLOO¶V@JKRVWV>RIWKHSDVW@´177 
 
In light of the influence of the Crown in this area, it is arguable that criticisms that recent 
Prime Ministers, including Mr Blair, have acted presidentially, dominantly or exercised their 
powers against the spirit of the constitution are erroneous.  On the contrary, using power in 
this way is entirely consistent with the structure and culture of the British constitution which, 
in this context, remains monarchical, autocratic and based on a central individual 
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figurehead.178  :KDW%DJHKRWWHUPHGWKHµGLJQLILHG¶ZLQGRZGUHVVLQJRI0RQDUFK\179 cannot 
and should not detract from the failings of this arrangement as demonstrated in the Iraq affair. 
 
 
 
 
Postscript 
 
Parliamentary involvement in warfare decisions returned to the fore in late August 2013 when 
Parliament was recalled to debate and vote on military action in Syria in response to the use 
of chemical weapons against civilians.  A government motion DXWKRULVLQJ HQJDJHPHQW µLQ
SULQFLSOH¶180 was unexpectedly and narrowly defeated by 285 to 272 votes.181  
 
 The Syria vote provides a further precedent contributing to the potential parliamentary 
approval convention discussed in Part 2.  Numerous M.P.s in the debate viewed it as an 
instance of parliamentary strength,182  DQGWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHUH[SOLFLWO\VWDWHGWKDWµthis House 
«ZLOOGHFLGHZKDWVWHSVZHQH[WWDNH¶183  
 
The Syria vote was constitutionally curious because it involved an exceptional defeat of the 
PriPH0LQLVWHU¶VIRUHLJQPLOLWDU\SROLF\DQGSUHYHQWHG0U&DPHURQIURPH[HUFLVLQJWKHZDU
prerogative as he preferred.184  However, this anomaly is not inconsistent with the thesis 
advanced here and three related points must be noted.  First, as leader of a coalition 
government the Prime Minister was unable to employ the confidence device because without 
a firm party majority in Parliament it carried a very high risk of losing.  Second, the exercise 
of prerogative powers outlined in Part 3 is generally dependent upon the political strength of 
government, and so their potential varies with political climates.  The government was in a 
weaker political position in the Syria debate for a number of reasons.  For example, the debate 
was held prematurely before UN weapons inspectors had completed their work, and before 
the UNSC had considered the matter;185 there were widespread concerns about operational 
uncertainties, mission creep etc.; and, ultimately, a general lack of public support for such 
action.  Finally, and ironically, the Iraq war loomed as an oft-recurring cautionary tale 
throughout the debate, indicating that its political-historical influence may be more profound 
than its constitutional one. 
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